The GENERAL CARGO “NORTH STAR”, IMO N° 7811410, flying Moldova Flag, sailing from TENES (ALGERY), arrived in Marina di Carrara Harbour on 17th May 2017 for cargo operations (marble blocks), with Priority 1 and subject to Expanded Inspection. Moreover, the vessel did not comply with the mandatory requirement imposed by Directive 2009/16/EC - article 9 (“notification of arrival of ships”).
The Port State Control team attended the vessel on 18th of May in the morning.

*Prima facie*, the vessel appeared to be clearly substandard, with worn and partially unreadable immersion scales, either bow or aft and a considerable level of rust and indentations affecting the hull.

Since the first approach, the Port State Control inspectors noted the unsafe gangway, with twisted and damaged steps. Later, whilst checking the rectification of the outstanding deficiencies, the inspectors recorded that as “recurrent deficiency”, still in place and not rectified from the previous PSC inspection.

During boarding procedures, the inspectors realized that crewmembers on watch - in charge to control access to the ship and embarkation of person and their effect - were not able to fill out the visitor’s log book and check ID documents, being unable to write and speak in English, despite of being the working language on board.

After a short briefing in the Captain’s office in order to explain the reason and the kind of inspection to be performed, the Team split in two for verification of ship’s documents and crew certificates and for performing operational checks.

As per PSCC Instruction 49/2016/09, operational controls involved all the ship, but nothing appeared to be in a good order.

At the second deck, just under the main deck, the ceiling bulkheads of the room leading to the steering room was cracked with evident signs of corrosion and water penetration from the upper deck; most of the lights were found inoperative, including all the emergency lights. Port State Control inspectors discovered that, due to a serious failure, the electric system was inoperative, as well the emergency generator and the emergency fire pump!

Before keeping on with the inspection, having realized yet the serious failure in crew’s performance and preparation, the PSCO asked the master to open and ventilate the aft peak tank, not only to prepare the tank for the inspection, but also to verify the level of knowledge of the crew for a safe entry into an enclosed space, including an enclosed space entry drill.

For the above all fire dampers and flaps were checked, but one of flap to close cargo air ventilation case fell down (see Picture n.2), being the hinges completely corroded.
Some bulkheads were found cracked and holed, especially the fore bulkhead segregating the cargo hold from the bosun store aft, while some other external bulkheads aft were found drilled in order to let cables and wires to pass through.

One vent case surrounding the forecastle, serving the cargo hold, was found completely cracked and attempted to be “homemade” repaired with a sort of fiber glass, impairing the watertightness of the hold.

Main fire line showed copious leakages from connection points and hydrants (see Picture n. 3); fire prevention in the engine room was completely compromised due to inoperability of all quick closing valves.

No better conditions were recorded for cargo hatch covers (see Picture n. 4), found holed by corrosion in several points, railings bent and in some cases completely ripped off. In addition, even a transversal strengthening structure inside the cargo hold was found heavily bent (Picture n. 5).

Completely not adequate the living conditions concerning crew cabins, quantity and quality of food on board.

Once the PSCOs received by the Master information that the aft peak was ready for the inspection, they realized that ventilation had not been operated, internal atmosphere not checked at all - despite the presence on board of a gas detector - and that the crew, including the Master were totally unaware about conditions to be met for a safe entry in an enclosed space.

Moreover it was discovered that sea water inside the tank was mixed with oil, probably hydraulic oil penetrated into the tank from the manhole, due to leakages from steering gear pumps (see Picture n. 6).
Fire and Abandon Ship drill were completely unsatisfactory, with a very poor performance of all the crew unable to communicate among them.

The inspection ended up with a complaint by the crew about working and living conditions on board and with reference of regular payment of wages. Confidentially, most of the crew reported wages only partially paid with no explanations by the owner, absence of drinking water for which they to supply on their own, and no rights to repatriation, which meant that they had to purchase flight ticket themselves. For this reason, later on, ITF inspectors were informed and tasked by local Port State Control Office for a joint inspection in Marina di Carrara.

The vessel was detained in Marina di Carrara for 21 days, from 18th May to 7th of June 2017, recording 29 deficiencies in total - 21 detainable deficiencies.

Most of the crewmembers signed off, including a Syrian seafarer, non-stop working on board since December 2015, once they received the entire amount of unpaid salaries and flight ticket for repatriation.

Picture n. 4: Hatch cover edge holed by severe corrosion.

Picture n. 5
Structures damaged (Railings and transversal strengthening)

Picture n. 6: Oil in WBT (Aft Peak Tank)
CONCLUSIONS

MV NORTH STAR was released from detention and granted to left the port of Marina di Carrara bound for Yalova (TK) repair yard, with a single voyage authorization issued by the Flag State, accepted by Italian PSCOs and Turkish Maritime Administration.

The vessel departed on 17th June 2017 after 21 days of detention and called at Yalova on 18th June 2016.

The Master and the Owner were previously informed about the consequence of a “refusal of access” from all EU waters, in case of failing to call the repair yard.